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Monetary unions. Institutions and policies.
My book "Monetary unions. Institutions and Policies" was released in May 2022 by Springer. Go and order it!​
It has been published in November 2019 by Editions Economica. It received the "Best Book" award of the French Economic Association in 2020.​ It focuses on a subject which is currently quite relevant, much discussed both by practioners (governements, central banks and other similar institutions) and academics, the notion of monetary union. There are many policy-oriented discussions, open or not, on the matter, in particular in relation to the advent of the European Monetary Union. Scientific journals also publish numerous articles on the subject. Yet it is not covered by a synthesis which could highlight the specificities of a monetary union and illuminates the dilemmas it raises.
​More information at the EUM page of this site. Table of content, presentation in French and in English, etc.​
1/ My paper, co-written with Olga Kuznetsova,​
"Talking heads. Talking heads. Public communication policies in an international economy "
has just been published in Economic Theory.
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Here is the abstract:
We study a non-cooperative communication game being played by national policymakers in a two-country economy including a beauty-contest argument in the utility function of agents and cross-border technology spillovers. Each policymaker receives some information either solely on the home technology idiosyncratic shock or on both shocks. She has the choice of revealing or not the received signal(s). The equilibrium of the noncooperative game being played by policymakers may entail revelation, either full or partial, or opacity, full or partial. This crucially depends on the interplay between the size of countries and the strength of the beauty contest motive. From a normative point of view, full or partial opacity may be optimal, showing that the social value of some public information may be negative due to cross-border spillovers. Public information provided by non-cooperative policymakers may be too little or too much.
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2/​ My paper, co-written with Stéphane Rossignol,
" Lockdowns and the Aggregate Dynamics of a Pandemic: Mind the Rebound! "
has just been published in the Journal of Public Economic Theory.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jpet.70050
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Here is the abstract:
We study optimal lockdown decisions taken by a policymaker facing a pandemic modelled according to the standard SIR deterministic model. The policymaker trades off between the economic costs and the mortality record of the pandemic which depend on the strictness and duration of the lockdown. We contrast the short-sightedness versus the far-sightedness of the policymaker. Peaks and rebounds are characterized and explain why a zero-Covid policy is self-defeating. The shortest duration consistent with a given health goal is not the less costly. We address the impact of hospital capacity constraints and vaccination on the optimal choice of a lockdown.​​​
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3/​ My paper, co-written with Ibrahima Diarra and Michel Guillard,
" Sovereign default and public debt sustainability: the debt recovery channel ",
has just been published in the Open Economies Review.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-025-09806-8.
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Here is the abstract:
We build a stochastic model of excusable sovereign default which incorporates a simple debt recovery rule. It depends on a single parameter that allows for partial debt recovery. We show that the maximum debt-to-GDP ratio that a country can sustain without defaulting is increasing, nonlinear, and sensitive to the debt-recovery parameter. We study the dynamics of public debt when the default premium is taken into account and offer new definitions of public debt unsustainability. A higher debt recovery parameter increases the fiscal space but worsens the financial position of a borrowing country after a default episode. We show that the estimated debt-recovery parameter is lower for emerging countries than for developed countries.